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B.: The Incontestability Clause in Life Insurance Policies
STUDENT NOTES
performance impossible."' Finding this contract to be unfair and
manifestly one-sided, the court denied relief.
A. L. B.
W. G. W.
THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE IN LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES
A thorough search of the law digests will reveal only two
West Virginia decisions' on the law of incontestability clauses in
life inslirance policies,2 those having been decided but recently and
on a single phase of the subject. It is therefore obvious that a
discussion which attempts to consider the West Virginia law on
this topic will be hopefully prophetic rather than critical.
A typical incontestable clause reads:
Incontestability. - This Policy shall be incontestable after
two years from its date of issue except for non-payment of
premium and except as to provisions and conditions
relating
3
to Double Indemnity and Disability Benefits.
Such clauses, peculiar to life insurance policies, are of recent
origin.4 Prior to their adoption, it frequently happened that the
insured, after paying premiums for many years, was found to have
left nothing to his beneficiaries but a disputed claim - the dispute too often being fraudulent. As a consequence, insurance began to lose favor in the eyes of the purchasing public. To induce
future business, 5 the companies began to write into their contracts
a promise that they would not dispute the claim after a period of
time. This developed into the incontestable clause as we lmow
it today - a private period of limitations between the company
and the insured.6
'5 Accord: Starcher v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S. E. 524, 9 L. R. A. (N. s.)
913, 123 Am. St. Rep. 990 (1907); Hartigan v. Hartigan, 58 W. Va. 610, 52

S. E. 720 (1906).

1 Morris v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 278, 171 S. E. 740 (1933);
Young v. Home Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 716, 173 S. E. 566 (1933).
2 This statement is verified in a marginal note to Equitable Life etc. Society
v. Deem, 91 P. (2d) 569, 571 (C. C. A. 4th2 1937).
3 Policy of New York Life Insurance Company.
4 COOKE, LIFE INsurANcE (1891) 232 refers to the clause only by a brief
footnote.
See Wright v. Mutual Benefit etc. Co., 118 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186, 6 L. R.
A. 731 (1890), the earliest case interpreting the clause.
6 Mutual Life etc. Co. v. Margolis, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 382, 53 P. (2d) 1017

(1936).
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The provision proved so desirable that many states began requiring the inclusion of such a clause in all policies. A search in
19327 revealed twenty-five states with such statutes, including New
York, Massachusetts, Virginia, and other states generally looked
to with respect by the West Virginia courts. West Virginia has
no such statute. However, it has become so commonplace for
policies to include this provision, and competition between companies so requires its inclusion, that these statutes probably have
very little effect.
If we look to the intended function of the clause - to prevent
the company from contesting the policy years after the grounds for
defense occurred, often after the insured is dead and the evidence
for him become vague or lost altogether - then it would seem that
many courts have taken an incorrect view in interpreting the
clause. Clearly it is intended to bar "inceptional defenses" those which arose during the application period, based on some
misrepresentation or fraud by the applicant.' But consider other
defenses which have been held to be barred by the clause. A
policy is issued which provides that if the insured should die in
consequence of his violation of the law, the policy should be void.
Years later, the insured is killed while attempting to commit robbery. The court holds9 that the incontestability clause bars a defense showing the cause of death. If that defense was not intended
to be reserved, why was the provision against such risk ever put
into the policy - surely not just for the year or two during the
contestable period. Why should an insurance company make the
violation of a condition render the policy void, and in the next
breath, declare that it will not contest the policy even though it
is void? However, so eminent a jurist as Judge (now, Mr. Justice)
Cardozo has said that the incontestable clause means that "the
policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense that it was invalid
in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by reason of a con7 See Note (1932) 11 N. C. L. Rsv. 92, note 6.
s Morris v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co.; Young v. Home Life Ins. Co., both
supra n. 1. In these cases the defenses were set up against recovery of disability benefits which were not excepted in the incontestability clause. Held,
that the clause applied, in absence of exception, with equal force to these
separate special benefits under the policy and barred the defense after the
contest period.
9 Sun Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 108 Ky. 408, 56 S. E. 668 (1900).
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dition broken."1 ' A policy provides that "self-destruction, sane
or insane, within one year from the date of this policy is a risk
not assumed by the company under this policy." The court holds"
that the company cannot show, after the contest period, that insured committed suicide within a year of the policy's issuance. It
is submitted that the parties to the contract did not intend these
defenses to be barred and that there are no reasons for giving
such effect to the incontestable clause.
One court has held12 that the passage of the contest period
denied the company the right to show that insured had no insurable interest, thus assisting in the enforcement of what is commonly deemed a wagering contract. Fortunately most courts will not
go so far." Though many courts state broadly that the insurer
is precluded from contesting the policy after the period on any
ground not specifically excepted in the clause, 14 it is doubtful
whether they would bar the defense of lack of insurable interest.
There is only one satisfactory reason to explain why conditions set out in the policy as rendering it void, or statements as to
risks not assumed by the company should be ignored by the courts.
This rests on the common law principle, Expressio unius est exclitsio alterius. When a clause reads, "This policy shall be incontestable after two years from its date of issue except for non-payment of premiums", it may well be argued that if the company
really intended to give up its privilege to contest the inceptional
defenses only, why did it except "non-payment of premiums" and
not any other defense? However, all courts hold that the defense
of nonpayment of premiums survives the contest period15 even
though the defense is not excepted in the incontestable clause."0
Since a defense based on insured's fraud in the procurement
of the policy is cut off by the expiration of the contest period, the
court will not allow the effect of this to be defeated by indirection.
10 In Matter of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449, 169
N. E. 642 (1930) (italics supplied).
-i Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Robbs, 177 Ark. 275, 6 S. W. (2d) 520 (1928).
12 Wright v. Mutual Benefit etc. Co., 118 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186 (1890).
'13 E. g., Dakota Life Ins. Co. v, Midland Nat. Bank, 18 F. (2d) 903 (C. 0.
A. 8th, 1927); Bromley v. Washington Life Ins. Co., 122 Ky. 402, 92 S. E.
17 (1906); Wharton v. Home Sec. Life Ins. Co., 206 N. C. 254, 173 S. E. 338

(1934).

14 37 C. 0. 542, note 76, citing fifteen states as so holding.
15 See Corley v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 179 S. C. 95, 183 S. E. 596 (1936).
1GLee v. Southern Life etc. Co., 19 Ala. App. 535, 98 So. 696 (1924);
semble Pope v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 192 Mo. App. 383, 181 S. W. 1047 (1916).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1938

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1938], Art. 6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Thus, the company may not sue insured in an action for deceit to
recover back what it paid out under the policy which it was unable to contest.'
The "contest" contemplated in the clause must be by or in
judicial proceedings - in equity to cancel the policy,' or by plea
or answer to an action on the policy. 1'0 In the latter cases, the company may avail itself of all defenses only if its plea or answer is
filed within the contest period.20 However, a suit for reformation
on grounds that the wrong policy was issued due to mutual mistake of fact is held not to be a contest 2 ' and can therefore be
brought by the company after the period has passed. Since such
proceedings may be brought years after the insured has lost all
his evidence, it would seem more proper that the incontestability
clause should bar such action by the company, for the validity of
the policy is being brought into question.
State and federal courts have reached widely varied and
irreconcilable results in attempting to construe incontestable
clauses which except double indemnity and disability benefits from
their operation. Obviously the companies intend to retain the
right of contesting recovery of these special benefits on some
grounds, but just what do they mean?
There are several conceivable defenses which the company
could use against recovery of special benefits. The grounds for
double indemnity or disability may have been caused by a risk
not assumed by the company. Thus, if the policy states, ".. . such
Double Indemnity Benefit shall not be payable if the Insured's
death resulted, directly or indirectly from (a) self destruction,
2 it would seem that the defense that
whether sane or insane ...
insured committed suicide should be available at any time, regardless of the expiration of the contest period. Then there are those
defenses arising at the inception of the policy, when the insurance
was applied for, on the ground of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations. Clearly these latter defenses are not available to the
17Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Wallerstein, 91 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A.
7th, 1937).
18 Peake v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 15 F. (2d) 303 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
1o Chun Ngit Ngan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 9 P. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 9th,
1925).
20 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 35 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
21 Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Black, 35 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 10th,

1929).

22 Policy of New York Life Insurance Company which lists eight other conditions which will defeat payment of double indemnity.
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company in an action for the face value of the policy after the
period of contestability; but are they also barred if the insured
seeks to enforce the special benefits under the policy? The answer
is made to depend on the wording of the excepting phrase.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals for the fourth circuit
in a recent case 23 distinguished between those phrases worded "except as to provisions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity"
and those which except "provisions and conditions" or "restrictions and provisions", and thus reconciled cases which seemed to
conflict. Basing its views on the rules of construction in insurance
cases - that if an expression in the policy is clear and unambiguous it must be understood in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense,
but if it is ambiguous it must be construed in the way most favorable to the insured - the court held that "provisions", by itself,
was unambiguous and so excepted the special benefits from the inTherefore, in that case the comcontestable clause altogether.2
pany was allowed to show fraud in the procurement of the policy
as a defense to the action. To be distinguished from this, the court
said, were those cases involving policies which excepted "provisions
Believing
and conditions" 2 or "restrictions and provisions"02
that the repetition created an ambiguity, the doubt was resolved
in favor of the insured, effect was given to only the narrower word
in each case, and inceptional defenses were held to be barred.
Not until 1937 did the United States Supreme Court grant
a writ of certiorariin one of these cases, 27 when it held that an incontestable clause excepting "restrictions and provisions applying
to Double'Indemnity and Disability Benefits . ..as provided in
sections one and three respectively . . ." did not save for the
insurer defenses arising in the inception of the policy. Thus it
Equitable Life etc. Society v. Deem, 91 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937).
Accord: Smith v. Equitable Life etc. Society, 169 Tenn. 477, 89 S. W.
(2d) 165 (1936); Greber v. Equitable Life etc. Society, 43 Ariz. 1, 28 P. (2d)
817 (1934); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Katz, 243 App. Div. 11, 275 N. Y. S.
23
24

743 (1934).

25 N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Truesdale, 79 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935);
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Yerys, 80 F. (2d) 264 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); N. Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Horwitz v. N. Y.
Life Ins. Co., 80 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935); Thompson v. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 248 (E. D. Okla., 1935). Contra: Pyramid Life Ins. Co.
v. Selkirk, 80 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936).
20 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Margolis, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 382, 53 P. (2d)
1017 (1936); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Markowitz, 78 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 9th,
193 ); Ness v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 70 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
27 Stroehmann v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 435, 57 S. Ct. 607, 81 L.

Ed. 732 (1937).
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seems the law is now settled on that question, and the company
cannot avail itself of inceptional defenses unless it makes its exceptions more specific than did the clause in that case.28 Excepting
"provisions" and leaving off the other word would seem sufficient
to do this.
Fortunately it may be reported, in conclusion, that a new attitude toward incontestable clauses seems to be arising, with a
proper protection of the insurer's rights. This position is adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in declaring,29 "To make a
contract incontestable after the lapse of a brief time is to confer
upon its holder extraordinary privileges. We must be on our
guaid against turning them into weapons of oppression."
E. H. B.
28 But see Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 94 F. (2d) 445 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1938) in which the court decides that an exception of "provisions
and conditions" is unambiguous so as to except disability benefits altogether.
Therefore the court allows the company to cancel the disability provision on
grounds of inceptional fraud, after the contest period has passed. The court
attempts to distinguish the Supreme Court ease, cited supra in note 27, because of the different wording of the exceptions.
20 American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U. S.203, 57 S. Ct. 377, 81 L. Ed.

605 (1937).
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